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In a recent article published in the North Carolina Law
Review, Professors Lester Brickman and Lawrence A. Cun-
ningham argued in favor of an ethics rule banning all use of
nonrefundable specific retainers. This proposal was based on
their conclusion that none of the proffered rationales in favor
of nonrefundable retainers is sufficient to justify the impact on
the client's discharge right occasioned by such fee practices.
The New York Court of Appeals in In re Cooperman substan-
tially adopted the conclusion of Professors Brickman and
Cunningham and held nonrefundable retainers to be
unethical
Professor Lubet analyzes the arguments set forth by
Brickman and Cunningham and concludes that, while their
position has persuasive appeal, significant questions must still
be answered before it can be deemed compelling. While he
agrees that Brickman and Cunningham's paradigm cases of
criminal defendants and domestic litigants pose risks of attor-
ney overreaching, he questions why a complete ban, as op-
posed to restrictions similar to those applicable to contingent
fees, is necessary. Having pointed out these shortcomings in
Brickman and Cunningham's argument, Professor Lubet con-
cludes by urging them to give further consideration to this is-
sue in the hope that they can dispel his concerns.
I. INTRODUCriON
What is to be done about lawyers who gouge their clients? Is it
sufficient to locate and punish the miscreants? Or is it necessary to
outlaw those fee practices most likely to be misused?
Identifying an injustice often is easier than prescribing a suitable
solution. In cases of individual damage, constructing a remedy that
appropriately balances compensation, deterrence, and incentive may
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University. I am grateful to Professors Stephen
Gillers, John Leubsdorf, and John Elson for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
essay. I received valuable research assistance from Catherine Lamsens. Research for this
paper was supported by a grant from the Stanford Clinton, Sr. Faculty Fund of Northwest-
ern University.
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be difficult.1 On a policy level the issues are even more complex.
What sorts of wrongdoing justify government intervention, and which
should be left to individual redress? If the government is to be in-
volved, should that involvement be civil, regulatory, or criminal?
How much leeway, if any, should be given to individuals to contract
around provisions of the law?
Concerning the relationship between professionals and clients,
the question of government supervision is especially troublesome.
Recognizing that a free society is well served by maximizing individual
access to the counsel and services of lawyers, physicians, clergy, and
others, Americans traditionally have hesitated to allow government to
intrude on the sanctity of the relationship between professionals and
their individual clients.' On the other hand, it is impossible to ignore
the potential for professionals to take advantage of their position by
abusing, exploiting, or overcharging their clients.
The same impulse that motivates the current national campaign
to contain medical costs also compels a close examination of certain
questionable fee practices of lawyers. As with medical expenses, any
proposed remedy must be calibrated carefully to resolve the identified
problem without creating new ones. Just as it would not be acceptable
to reduce medical expenditures in a way that would result in severely
diminished services, the law should not rush to circumscribe attorneys'
fees in a way that will limit client freedom or professional autonomy.
Professor Lester Brickman has performed great service with a se-
ries of articles addressing problems in the area of attorney fees.3 In
1. Balancing of compensation, deterrence, and incentive has been used to analyze a
variety of legal problems. See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient
Deterrence, 52 MD. L. REv. 1093 (1993) (balancing compensation with deterrence regard-
ing tort system); Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COM.
mNTARY 279 (1992) (balancing compensation with deterrence regarding takings); Saul
Levmore & William J. Stuntz, Remedies and Incentives in Private and Public Law: A Com-
parative Essay, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 483 (1990) (analyzing incentive effects in a variety of
legal topics by exploring the competition between damage and disgorgement remedies);
Stephen F. Williams, Second Best: The Soft Underbelly of Deterrence Theory in Tort, 106
HARv. L. REv. 932 (1993) (suggesting that system of liability based on optimal deterrence
cannot be expected to achieve optimality with respect to health and safety hazards).
2. It should be recalled, for example, that the original basis for the decision in Roe v.
Wade was the need to protect the physician-patient relationship from undue intrusion. Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156 (1973).
3. Lester Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers Revisited,
72 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Revisited]; Les-
ter Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: Impermissible
Under Fiduciary, Statutory and Contract Law, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 149 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Impermissible]; see also Lester Brickman &
Jonathan Klein, The Use of Advance Fee Attorney Retainer Agreements in Bankruptcy: An-
other Special Law for Lawyers?, 43 S.C. L. REv. 1037 (1992) (suggesting that Bankruptcy
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particular, he and Professor Lawrence Cunningham have attacked the
apparently common use of nonrefundable retainers.4 It is their con-
viction that all nonrefundable retainer agreements are unethical.5 The
important New York Court of Appeals recently adopted their
position.
6
The nonrefundable retainer seems like a good target for those
seeking to reform lawyers' fee practices. Brickman and Cunningham
point out that nonrefundable retainers are frequently used in divorce
and criminal cases, where clients often are extremely vulnerable to
lawyer exploitation and overreaching.7 Unscrupulous practitioners
can use (or attempt to use) such retainers to extract payment for work
that is never performed. In In re Cooperman,' for example, the court
suspended a lawyer who refused to refund a client's advance payment,
despite the lawyer's utter failure to provide any legal services.9
As a teacher of legal ethics, I would like very much to support
Brickman and Cunningham in their campaign. Nonrefundable retain-
ers, as Brickman and Cunningham describe them, seem sleazy and un-
Code may prohibit advance fee payments); Lester Brickman, Setting the Fee When the Cli-
ent Discharges a Contingent Fee Attorney, 41 EMORY L.J. 367 (1992) (arguing that dis-
charged attorneys employed on a contingency fee basis should not be entitled to a fee in
excess of the contract percentage) [hereinafter Brickman, Setting the Fee].
Professor Brickman is also the principal author of a recent study criticizing the current
use of contingent fees and proposing changes in the manner of their calculation. Peter
Passell, Windfall Fees in Injury Cases Under Assault, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1994, at Al.
4. See Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Revisited, supra note 3 passim. Defining a
nonrefundable retainer as "a fee paid by a client in advance of services and denominated
by the lawyer as nonrefundable, irrespective of whether the client discontinues the repre-
sentation or whether the lawyer does any work," Brickman and Cunningham object to
their use under any circumstances. Id. at 3.
It is always good to see law professors stand up for clients. Far too much legal scholar-
ship is devoted to arcana such as economic modeling or game theory. While there is noth-
ing wrong or bad about abstraction, it is also important that the academy devote serious
attention to the concrete issues that arise between lawyers and clients.
5. See Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Revisited, supra note 3, at 38-39. This
position goes beyond Brickman and Cunningham's earlier conclusion that "most
nonrefundable retainers are legally and ethically impermissible," Brickman & Cunning-
ham, Retainers Impermissible, supra note 3, at 153 (emphasis added), and that "one can
conceive of circumstances, however unusual, in which a nonrefundable retainer may be
valid," id. at 188.
6. In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (N.Y. 1994); see also In re Cooperman,
591 N.Y.S.2d 855, 859 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (per curiam) (holding that nonrefundable
retainers are unethical); Brandes v. Zingmond, 573 N.Y.S.2d 579, 582 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991)
(holding that nonrefundable retainers are invalid under contract law). New York appears
to be the only jurisdiction whose highest court has directly considered whether nonrefund-
able retainers are flatly unethical.
7. Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Revisited, supra note 3, at 12.
8. 591 N.Y.S.2d 855, 859 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
9. Id. at 858.
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ethical. Who can argue that clients are not entitled to the return of
unearned fees? Why should lawyers be able to keep money for work
that was never done?
Nonetheless, Brickman and Cunningham's work, at least to date,
raises a number of unanswered questions. They certainly make out
their case that nonrefundable retainers can be a bad thing. But there
has always been a case-by-case rule against charging excessive fees,10
and another longstanding rule requires lawyers to refund unearned
fees upon withdrawal from representation." Those well-established
professional rules would seem to provide a sufficient basis on which to
discipline lawyers who, in fact, gouge, cheat, or otherwise exploit their
clients.
Brickman and Cunningham, however, take the position that all
nonrefundable retainers are per se unethical, no matter how drafted.
They believe that such arrangements should be strictly proscribed, and
that even contractual attempts to circumvent this prohibition should
expose lawyers to professional discipline.' 2 According to Brickman
and Cunningham, an attorney would be in trouble simply for request-
ing that a client agree to a nonrefundable retainer, whether or not the
retainer actually harmed the client,'13 and regardless of the client's so-
phistication or the nature of the negotiation. 14 Much as my senti-
ments impel me to agree with Brickman and Cunningham, I fear that
such a blanket proscription requires stronger justification than has yet
been offered.
The balance of this essay details the difficulties apparent in Brick-
man and Cunningham's analysis of the nonrefundable retainer prob-
lem. These criticisms are offered in a spirit of general agreement with
the goal of enhanced client protection, and I hope that there are an-
swers for all of my questions.
10. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (1992); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (1981).
11. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(d) (1992); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 2-110(A)(2) (1981).
12. Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Revisited, supra note 3, at 39-40. Brickman
and Cunningham's view on these issues seems to have hardened following the ruling of the
intermediate appellate court in In re Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d 855 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)
(per curiam). See Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Impermissible, supra note 3, at 153,
188.
13. Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Revisited, supra note 3, at 10.
14. Cf. Brickman & Cinningham, Retainers Impermissible, supra note 3, at 179 (noting
that a party's sophistication may be relevant).
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II. CLIENT AUTONOMY AND WAIVER
A. Autonomy
Brickman and Cunningham give little weight to the possibility
that a nonrefundable retainer might be the product of rational negoti-
ation between attorney and client. Likewise, the Cooperman court
declared nonrefundable retainers flatly unethical, thereby placing
them beyond the pale of legitimate agreement.
15 'They may be right.
Perhaps nonrefundable retainers are so unconscionable that no sane
client would ever consent to one. That position, however, cannot be
made convincing without taking greater account of client autonomy,
acumen, and intelligence.
Brickman and Cunningham express the concern that nonrefund-
able retainers are "used most widely in contexts where client vulnera-
bility is highest"'-by matrimonial, criminal defense, and bankruptcy
lawyers. 7 Because client vulnerability suggests lawyer overreaching,
Brickman and Cunningham reject the possibility that a nonrefundable
retainer might be the product of a knowing bargain. This sense of an
urgent need to shield naive, powerless clients leads Brickman and
Cunningham to prefer the sweeping remedy of complete abolition.
But not all clients are vulnerable. Not even all matrimonial, crim-
inal, and bankruptcy clients are susceptible to overreaching. If certain
types of cases suggest the need for extra protection, the logical solu-
tion would appear to be a restriction on nonrefundable retainers, not
a complete ban under all circumstances. Indeed, the New York Court
of Appeals took just such an approach to other aspects of attorney's
fees by adopting a separate set of rules for domestic relations 
cases18
Similarly, it is unethical in virtually every jurisdiction to charge a con-
tingent fee in divorce or criminal cases, though not in any other kind
of litigation.' 9 Thus, to regulate fees only in those defined circum-
stances where regulation is most needed is hardly a novel idea.
15. Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
16. Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Revisited, supra note 3, at 13.
17. Id. at 3; see also P. Thomas Thornbrugh, The Nonrefundable-Fee Minefield, A.B.A.
J., Apr. 1994, at 105 (noting that nonrefundable retainers are widely used in matrimonial
practice).
18. McKinney's 1993 New York Rules of Court § 136.2 (22 NYCRR § 136.2) (relating
to binding fee arbitration in matrimonial cases).
It has also been widely suggested that sexual relations between attorneys and clients
be made per se unethical in divorce representation, though not necessarily in other types of
cases. Lawrence Dubin, Sex and the Divorce Lawyer: Is the Client Off Limits?, 1 GEo. J.
LEGAL ETHics 585, 618 (1988); Margit Livingston, When Libido Subverts Credo: Regula-
tion of Attorney-Client Sexual Relations, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 5. 47 (1993).
19. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.5(d) (1992); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(C) (1981).
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There are certainly many sophisticated clients in the world, some
of whom might knowingly agree to pay a nonrefundable retainer.
Corporations have become increasingly adept at negotiating fee
agreements; they are frequently represented in these transactions by
their own in-house counsel, who are surely attuned to protecting the
client's interests in the fee arrangement. At a time when creative bill-
ing is all the rage, 0 it is imaginable that a business client might want
to offer a nonrefundable retainer as an inducement for the attorney to
accept a fee cap or a reduced hourly rate. In other words, the client
might say, "I will offer you a guaranteed minimum fee, even if you do
little or no work, so long as you agree to a maximum charge, no mat-
ter how much work you do." Such a shared-risk compact seems emi-
nently sensible,2' but it would be anathema to Brickman and
Cunningham and, following Cooperman, unethical in New York.
Brickman and Cunningham explain in great detail that
nonrefundable retainers actually buy little or nothing for the client.
They ably refute the argument that a nonrefundable retainer can be
seen as payment for an attorney's availability to handle a specific mat-
ter." What they do not address adequately, however, is the concept
of the nonrefundable retainer as an initial inducement to undertake
the case-a sort of signing bonus. 3 A truly busy or prominent lawyer
could rationally decide to handle only cases that insure, in advance, a
certain level of payment. 24 A client would have to guarantee that
20. See, e.g., John E. Morris, Two Pioneers Make a Fixed-Fee Deal Work, AM. LAW.,
Dec. 1993, at 5 (recognizing a prominent law firm's successful use of large-scale alternative
fee arrangement with the firm's largest litigation client); Randall Samborn, Vanguard of a
Fee Revolt, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at Al (pointing out that a new litigation boutique
emphasizes creative billing methods); Stewart Yerton, The Croesus of Cambridge, AM.
LAW., Apr. 1994, at 63 (noting that one prominent law professor utilizes complex, innova-
tive fee structures in private practice).
21. My daughter's orthodontist utilizes such an approach, which he calls a "closed fee"
arrangement. At the beginning of orthodontic care he estimates the likely duration and
complexity of the treatment. Based on this projection he then sets a fixed fee, which is
paid in advance. If it takes longer than expected to straighten the patient's teeth, the or-
thodontist loses; if it takes less time, he wins. In either case, the risk of guessing incorrectly
is shared with the patient (or, more realistically, with the patient's parents and insurer). In
the event that the patient terminates treatment prior to conclusion, a pro rata refund may
or may not be given, depending on the circumstances. This appears to be a matter of
patient relations and practice economics, rather than dental ethics.
Other orthodontists, I am informed, utilize "open fees," whereby the patient pays for
each separate visit and adjustment. Under this system, the patient bears the risk. Accord-
ing to our orthodontist, this arrangement usually results in higher cost to the patient.
22. Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Revisited, supra note 3, at 22-28.
23. The nonrefundable retainer could also function as a reward or incentive for
prompt resolution. See infra note 96.
24. A few lawyers may be so much in demand that the acceptance of one side of a
case, even if the representation is short-lived, will truly and actually preclude them from
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amount, in the form of a nonrefundable retainer, to obtain the law-
yer's services. Negotiated at arm's length, between equally informed
parties, such a transaction seems neither better nor worse than the
enormous hourly rates routinely charged by Wall Street partners.
To a vulnerable client, of course, the insistence on a nonrefund-
able retainer could amount to extortion. A client facing prison, im-
poverishment, or loss of home and family might well be bullied or
slickered into thinking that a garden-variety lawyer is actually one of
the prominent elite. This is one of the fears that motivate Brickman
and Cunningham.' Their remedy protects such naive clients, but at
the cost of precluding negotiation by all others.
B. Waiver
It does not seem possible for a client to waive the protection of
the Cooperman rule, even in return for valuable consideration. Brick-
man and Cunningham propose a corresponding amendment to the
ethics rules, providing that "[a]ny effort, by contract or otherwise, to
[obtain a nonrefundable retainer] shall be null, void, and unenforce-
able, and lawyers and law firms involved in making any such effort
shall have violated" the rules of ethics.
26
The breadth of this proposal is enormous. If adopted, the free-
dom from nonrefundable retainers would become one of the few un-
waivable "rights" of clients. The various ethics codes allow clients to
relinquish rights far more fundamental than refundability: Clients can
consent to most conflicts of interest;27 they can waive the attorney-
client privilege;2 and they can accede to limitations on the objectives
of representation. 29 Clients can forego the right to proceed against
their attorneys for malpractice,30 consent to the aggregate settlement
accepting more lucrative retention by the adverse party. Brickman and Cunningham dis-
count this as a real concern, arguing that the client does "not gain anything as a result of
that preclusion." Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Revisited, supra note 3, at 34. What
the client gets, however, is the instant retention of the lawyer, who might otherwise decline
the case or elect to wait and see if a better offer develops in the same matter. I agree with
Brickman and Cunningham that this benefit is ephemeral with regard to most practition-
ers, but it is quite real in the case of some.
25. Id. at 11.
26. Id. at 40.
27. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7-1.9 (1992).
28. Id. Rules 1.6, 1.9.
29. Id. Rule 1.2(c).
30. Id. Rule 1.8(h). Indeed, the Model Rules go so far as to allow the prospective
limitation of malpractice liability, if the client is separately counseled in making the agree-
ment. Id. According to Professor John Leubsdorf of Rutgers University, however, no ju-
risdiction appears to have allowed or upheld such an agreement. See Letter from Professor
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of claims,' and even agree to be sued by their own lawyers.32 Brick-
man and Cunningham do not explain why refundable fees should be
more sacrosanct than competence, loyalty, zeal, or confidentiality.
In this regard, Rule 1.8(a) of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct is instructive, providing that a lawyer "shall not enter into a
business transaction with a client" unless the client consents in writing
after being given a reasonable opportunity to obtain the advice of in-
dependent counsel.3 The rule recognizes that there is great room for
abuse when attorneys engage in business dealings with their clients,
but it allows informed clients to waive its protection 4.3  Indeed, judg-
ing from the frequency of reported cases, many more clients have
been victimized in the course of business relationships than have been
aggrieved by nonrefundable fees.35
Consider the impact of an unwaivable per se rule as it might op-
erate regarding other common fee abuses. In my experience, the
overstaffing of cases-assigning three, four, or more lawyers to do
work that could just as well be accomplished by one-seems to be at
least as significant a problem as nonrefundable retainers.3 6 Indeed,
overstaffing is probably a more insidious problem: A client is aware
that she is signing a nonrefundable retainer agreement, but has little
way of knowing how many associates are churning out unnecessary
work in the back rooms of the law office.37 In Brickman and Cun-
ningham's terms, all clients "give great weight and tremendous defer-
John Leubsdorf to Steven Lubet (May 14, 1994) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
31. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(g) (1992).
32. See Id. Rule 1.7(a)(2).
33. Id. Rule 1.8(a).
34. Id.; see also Id. Rule 1.8(h) (allowing "agreements prospectively limiting the law-
yer's liability to a client for malpractice" if the client is independently represented in mak-
ing the agreement).
35. See CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL Emics 479-85 (1986). Professor Wolf-
ram lists scores of cases reviewing, and usually rebuking, lawyers who have entered into
business dealings with their clients. Id. In contrast, Brickman and Cunningham point to
only a handful of cases dealing directly with client complaints about nonrefundable retain-
ers. Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Revisited, supra note 3 passim. A Lexis search in
July 1994 identified nearly 300 cases involving Rule 1.8(a) and its various analogs. See
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-104(A) (limiting business transac-
tions with clients); CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-300 (1988)
(same). A search of variations on "nonrefundable retainer," however, yielded fewer than
70 cases.
Of course, reported cases are only the tip of the iceberg. There are obviously many
more abused clients than there are cases that have reached the appellate courts, but this is
equally true of both business dealings and nonrefundable retainers.
36. Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 659, 760 n.392 (1990).
37. Id. at 706.
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ence to their lawyer's [sic] opinions, judgment and advice" on how the
legal work is to be accomplished. 8 Imagine, then, a rule that made it
always unethical to assign more than two lawyers to prepare for a dep-
osition or to appear in court to argue a motion. Imagine further that
this rule was unwaivable, and that attempts to circumvent it could lead
to professional discipline.
Virtually all of Brickman and Cunningham's arguments could be
made on behalf of such an overstaffing rule. Clients are in an unequal
position with regard to determining staffing, preparation, and research
needs.39 The unnecessary staffing provides virtually nothing of value
for the client.4" Indeed, the multiplication of sunk costs even burdens
the client's inviolable right to discharge the law firm.4 Even recogniz-
ing the need to limit overstaffing, perhaps through the use of guide-
lines or presumptions, it is clear that an unwaivable staffing limit
would result in an intolerable restriction on the client's right to deter-
mine the nature of her own representation. 42
Immutable ethics rules constrain clients as well as attorneys. Re-
spect for the autonomy and intelligence of individuals generally re-
quires that they be allowed to choose when they do and do not want
protection. Protecting clients by denying them choices is an extreme
step. There may be policy reasons that dictate such an approach for
nonrefundable retainers,43 but Brickman and Cunningham do not ad-
38. Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Revisited, supra note 3, at 11.
39. Id.
40. Is there any doubt that one lawyer could prepare adequately for a deposition? A
single lawyer might take longer than a team, but the payoff would be the client's certainty
that the case had not been churned. True, a client might not want that particular payoff,
but the point of rulemaking is to provide protection even if there is a resulting loss of
autonomy. The ironic nature of rulemaking is that the "protectees" may actually be
harmed or restricted by the rule. The irrationality of a given result becomes an argument
against using a rule to accomplish a particular goal.
41. Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Revisited, supra note 3, at 13; see infra part
III.
42. Note that my hypothetical rule limits only the number of lawyers who could under-
take a specific task, not the number who could be assigned to a case. Restricting a client's
right to hire numerous lawyers would probably violate the Sixth Amendment, the Four-
teenth Amendment, or both. A ceiling on staffing, however, would arguably be permissi-
ble as a fee control.
43. The rule against contingent fees in divorce cases is unwaivable, but not in order to
proteqt individual clients. Rather, the rule is intended to advance a public policy that fa-
vors reconciliation. Thus, attorneys and clients are prohibited from entering into fee
agreements where the attorney's incentive is to procure the dissolution of a marriage, even
if such an agreement would be financially beneficial to the client. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr RULE 1.5(d)(1) (1984); see also WOLFRAM, supra note 35, at 539
("The now customary, and quite sound, primary justification for the prohibition against
contingent fees in divorce cases is that the arrangement would put strong economic pres-
sure on the lawyer to assure that reconciliation did not occur."); cf. In re Pagano, 607
1994]
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equately address the issue of waiver. They do not make out the em-
pirical case that nonrefundable retainers are so prevalent (and so
uniformly evil) that they must not be countenanced under any
circumstances.
III. Thi RIGHT OF DISCHARGE
Brickman and Cunningham's principal objection to nonrefund-
able retainers is that they chill the clients' absolute right to discharge
counsel: Clients must be free to fire their attorneys at any time, with-
out cost or penalty; nonrefundable retainers necessarily contravene
this right. According to Brickman and Cunningham, the driving force
behind the prohibition of nonrefundable retainers is "to protect the
client's inviolate right to discharge her lawyer at any time, for any
reason, without penalty." 44
BrickInan and Cunningham see burden-free discharge as a bed-
rock client right. Hence, any fee device that impedes the exercise of
this right must be unethical. The argument is elegant, but it proves
too much. In fact, there is no absolute right to discharge counsel.
Therefore, clients often pay a price for firing their lawyers. Brickman
and Cunningham's conclusion does not follow directly from their
premise.
A. Prohibiting Discharge
As a preliminary matter, it should be acknowledged that, dicta
notwithstanding, the courts do not recognize clients' absolute right to
discharge counsel. If in doubt, just spend a day or so in any criminal
courts building and watch judges routinely deny defendants' requests
to fire their attorneys.
45
N.E.2d 1242, 1246-47 (II. 1992) (considering the application of a statute governing attor-
ney's fees in divorce cases). Section 508 of the Illinois Dissolution of Marriage Act allows
a court to enter an order requiring either party to a divorce to "pay a reasonable amount
for his own costs and attorney's fees," but only after due notice and hearing. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 40, para. 508(a) (1992). The court, pursuant to this statute, may enter a judgment
requiring a party to pay a specific sum to her own lawyer. Id. The right to a hearing in this
situation may be waived, however, even though "an unscrupulous attorney may unfairly
use the extra leverage gained by the client's dependency." Pagano, 607 N.E.2d at 1247.
The consequence of a non-waiver rule would be that clients could never offer their attor-
neys the security of a fee order without undertaking the additional time and expense of a
judicial hearing. The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the position that the validity of such
a waiver would depend upon the circumstances of the particular case, but that the waiver
would be presumed to be the product of undue influence. Id.
44. Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Revisited, supra note 3, at 13.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 107-11 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1211 (1988); United States v. Rettaliata, 833 F.2d 361,362-64 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United
280 [Vol. 73
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The right to discharge counsel is an essential element of the right
to retain counsel of choice: You cannot have the lawyer you want if
you cannot get rid of the lawyer you do not want. This interest should
never be stronger than in criminal proceedings, where the client is
protected by the Sixth Amendment. Nonetheless, there is virtually no
dissent from the rule that a court's interest in expediting trial may
take precedence over a client's interest in counsel of choice.4 6
This principle has been enshrined in the ethics rules. Rule 1.16(c)
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides that a lawyer
must continue to represent a client, even if discharged, "when ordered
to do so by a tribunal."4 7  Rule 1.16(c), moreover, does not distin-
guish between criminal and civil cases, raising at least the possibility
that a civil litigant, like a criminal defendant, could be forced to trial
States v. Whaley, 788 F.2d 581, 583-84 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986); Thomas
v. Wainwright, 767 F.2d 738, 740-44 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986);
People v. Turner, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 388, 389-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Commonwealth v.
Diatchenko, 443 N.E.2d 397, 403 (Mass. 1982); Paris v. Commonwealth, 389 S.E.2d 718,
719-23 (Va. App. 1990).
46. Perhaps the most famous example of this occurred in the Chicago Conspiracy trial.
See United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972). Bobby Seale, one of the original
Chicago Eight defendants, was represented by his personal attorney, Charles Garry of San
Francisco. Id. at 349. Mr. Garry, however, became ill and could not appear for the begin-
ning of the trial. Id. The trial judge, Julius Hoffman, refused to grant a continuance or
adjournment, and instead insisted that William Kunstler represent Seale. Id. at 349-50 (As
attorney for several of the other defendants, Kunstler had also appeared for Seale on cer-
tain pretrial matters.) Seale protested, to the point of "firing" Kunstler in open court. Id.
Kunstler accepted his discharge with grace, but the court would not recognize his resigna-
tion. Id. Seale persisted in protesting that he had fired Kunstler. after which the court
ordered the defendant bound'and gagged. Id. Seale eventually was severed from the trial,
which proceeded as the Chicago Seven. Id. The Seventh Circuit ruled that Judge Hoffman
had erred by refusing to consider the circumstances of Kunstler's appearance, but did not
reach the issue of the defendant's right to fire his attorney. Id. For a more detailed de-
scription of Bobby Seale's statements and conduct during the trial, see JOHN SCHULTZ,
THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY TRIAL, 35-80 (1993). For less famous instances in which de-
fendants were not allowed to fire counsel, see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
47. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF-ESSIONAL CoNDUcr Rule 1.16(c) (1992). More specifi-
cally, Rule 1.16(a) requires a lawyer to withdraw from representation if "the lawyer is
discharged," except in circumstances covered by subparagraph (c). Id. Rule 1.16(a). In
turn, Rule 1.16(c) states that "[w]hen ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall con-
tinue representation notwithstanding good cause for termination the representation." Id.
Rule 1.16(c).
The predecessor Model Code of Professional Responsibility, still in effect in New
York and several other states, is to the same effect. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBiLrry DR 2-110(A)(1), DR 2-110(B)(4) (1981). Disciplinary Rule 2-110(A)(1) pro-
vides that "[i]f permission for withdrawal from employment is required by the rules of a
tribunal, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment in a proceeding before that tribu-
nal without its permission," even though withdrawal would otherwise be mandatory upon
discharge by the client. Id. DR 2-110(A)(1); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(B)(4) (1981) (providing that withdrawal is mandatory when
lawyer is discharged by client).
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with an attorney whom she has "fired." Admittedly, that result is
more likely in criminal cases, where the Sixth Amendment all but re-
quires that some lawyer represent each defendant. In civil cases a
court has the option of allowing the discharge and forcing the client to
trial without an attorney.4 Of course, proceeding to trial without
counsel is a steep price to pay for firing one's lawyer. Certainly, it is a
burden on the "right of discharge" of the sort that Brickman and Cun-
ningham maintain must not exist.
It is evident that the "right of discharge" is not so absolute as
Brickman and Cunningham posit.49 To be sure, a court's interest in
efficiency is not the same as a lawyer's interest in payment. It is cer-
tainly possible that the client's discharge right should trump the law-
yer's concerns, though not the court's. Brickman and Cunningham,
however, base their argument on the assertion of an absolute right,
claiming that it is not necessary to examine the competing considera-
tions.5" Upon realizing, however, that the discharge right is not quite
sacrosanct, it becomes necessary to analyze the lawyer's contrary in-
terests, if only to distinguish them from the court's.
B. Burdening Discharge
The extent of a client's right to discharge his attorney is only the
beginning of the discussion. That a lawyer may always be fired does
not mean that there should never be economic consequences to the
client.5 '
48. See, e.g., Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251,256-57 (1st Cir. 1986):
Hall v. Doctors' Hosp. of Tioga, 486 So. 2d 1164, 1168 (La. App. 1986); Bacon v. Carey
Co., 669 P.2d 533, 535 (Wyo. 1983).
49. Of course, requiring clients to be represented by lawyers whom they mistrust and
have attempted to fire would be poor policy. I do not mean to suggest that such "represen-
tation" should generally be permitted or encouraged. My point, however, is that the cur-
rent state of the law definitely does give courts the discretion to thwart a client's effort to
discharge her lawyer.
50. Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Revisited, supra note 3, at 28-29, 31.
51. In Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150 (Cal. 1993), for example, the California
Supreme Court upheld a law firm partnership agreement that required withdrawing part-
ners to forego certain contractual benefits if they thereafter competed with their former
partners. Id. at 155. Although it was argued that this provision violated the ethical prohi-
bition against lawyers participating in an agreement that "restricts the right of a member of
the State Bar to practice law," id. at 156 n.6, the court held that it was permissible to
"assess[ ] a reasonable cost against a partner who chooses to compete with his or her for-
mer partners," id. at 156. In other words, the rules of ethics do not prohibit the attach-
ment of an economic consequence to an otherwise unrestricted choice. Id.
The California court recognized that the imposition of such a "toll" could limit the
ability of clients to have access to the attorney of their choice. Id. at 159-60. Nonetheless,
the court reasoned that "the theoretical freedom of any client to select his or her attorney
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For the origin of the termination-at-will rule, Brickman and Cun-
ningham look to Martin v. Camp,52 in which the New York Court of
Appeals held that a discharged lawyer could not sue his client for con-
tract damages.53 The basic holding of the case is that the client may
terminate the attorney's employment at any time and for any reason,
and that this right is an implied provision of their contract. Thus, the
lawyer could not seek his expected profit as damages for wrongful
discharge, although he could recover in quantum meruit.5 4
Most significantly, though, the Martin court held that the quan-
tum meruit limitation does not apply where "the attorney in entering
into such a contract has changed his position or incurred expense."'55
The lawyer in such circumstances could obtain consequential damages
upon being terminated by the client.56 A client's absolute right of dis-
charge, therefore, can be burdened by an obligation to compensate
the attorney for reliance-based losses. 7
Imagine, for instance, that a client retained a New York lawyer to
render certain specific, identified services58 in Washington, D.C. Re-
lying on the contract of employment, the attorney leased office space,
moved her residence, and perhaps even withdrew from lucrative
pending matters in New York. Under Martin, the client could none-
theless discharge the lawyer at any time and for any reason. The law-
yer has no right to insist on the fulfillment of the contract or to
maintain an action for expected profits. The lawyer could sue, how-
ever, for the damages occasioned by her reliance-based changes of po-
sition, even if those changes conferred no economic benefit on the
client, and even if the lawyer had not yet done any work pursuant to
the retainer.
of choice is inconsistent with the reality that [this freedom is] actually circumscribed." Id.
at 158.




56. The Martin court also excepted "general retainers" from the sweep of its holding.
Id. For a review of Brickman and Cunningham's analysis of general retainers, see infra
part IV.
57. Such a burden may not be of the sort that concerns Brickman and Cunningham,
since it compensates the lawyer for expenses incurred in the performance of the contract.
The question remains, however, whether the distinction makes a difference. To the client,
a financial cost is a burden, no matter what it covers. To establish their proposition, Brick-
man and Cunningham therefore cannot rely on the construct of absolute burden-free dis-
charge. Rather, they must demonstrate that, depending on the form, some burdens are
"ethical," while others are not.
58. Note that this hypothetical involves a specific, as opposed to a general, retainer,
the significance of which is stressed by Brickman and Cunningham. See infra part IV.
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The prospect of paying for an unused office lease, not to mention
the possibility of providing compensation for foregone work, would
no doubt discourage the client from discharging her counsel. None-
theless, that outcome is not prohibited by Martin or its progeny.5 9
An additional host of adverse economic consequences may flow
from a client's decision to dismiss her counsel. The lawyer is generally
under no duty to refund earned fees even if, as a result of the dis-
charge, some or all of their benefit will be lost to the client. The client
probably will have to spend extra money to bring her new attorney
"up to speed." In nearly every case there will be delay, duplication of
effort, or other waste, all of which may result in additional attorney's
fees. In other words, the termination of a privately retained lawyer
almost always will be attended by some cost to the client. Hence, the
notion of an unburdened right of discharge is a myth.
Brickman and Cunningham would no doubt point out the differ-
ence between costs that inevitably accompany discharge and those
that are separately (or additionally) imposed by the retainer agree-
ment. It might be said that we cannot protect clients from all of the
economic consequences of firing their lawyers, but we can protect
them from nonrefundable retainers. But this argument still leaves
questions unanswered. For example, why should a fired lawyer be re-
quired to return only unearned fees? 60 An absolute, unfettered right
of discharge would seem to compel a return of all fees, whether
earned or not; otherwise, the client is inhibited in exercising her right
to choice of counsel. 61 The New York Court of Appeals was con-
cerned that the forfeiture of a nonrefundable retainer could render a
59. Moreover, the Martin doctrine would not necessarily prohibit advance, nonrefund-
able payments to a lawyer in consideration of her change of position. That is, if the lawyer
could sue the client for changed-circumstances damages, why not allow the attorney and
client to negotiate that aspect of the fee up front? Brickman and Cunningham apparently
accepted the availability of changed circumstances lawsuits in their first article on
nonrefundable retainers. See Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Impermissible, supra
note 3, at 157. Nonetheless, the Cooperman opinion, not to mention Brickman & Cun-
ningham's latest proposal, appears to prohibit er ante negotiation. See Brickman & Cun-
ningham, Retainers Revisited, supra note 3, at 10 n.31. This is an anomaly. Under
Brickman and Cunningham's suggested ethics rule, a discharged lawyer could sue a client
for damages based on changed circumstances, but the client could not limit her exposure
by agreeing in advance to a liquidated payment.
60. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(d) (1992).
61. In the abortion area, the United States Supreme Court has held that a right is not
infringed simply because it is made more costly, so long as it still may be freely exercised.
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,474 (1977). Both nonrefundable retainers and the retention of
earned fees make the exercise of the right of discharge more costly. In the absence of a
compelling argument, it would seem that the two types of costs ought to be treated compa-
rably. It falls to Brickman and Cunningham to explain how one cost infringes on the cli-
ent's rights, while the other does not.
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client hostage to "an unwanted fiduciary relationship," because the
loss of the retainer would "impose a penalty on a client for daring to
invoke a hollow right to discharge."'62 But the same logic also applies
to quantum meruit payments, which both the New York Court and
Brickman and Cunningham endorse.63 A client who has sunk consid-
erable funds into a lawyer's representation no longer has that money
available to retain new counsel. Much, if not all, of the first lawyer's
work may well be untransferable, thus requiring a complete duplica-
tion of effort by the replacement lawyer. Depending upon the client's
financial situation this may render her hostage to the unwanted rela-
tionship just as firmly as would a nonrefundable retainer. Indeed,
from the client's perspective there is very little difference between los-
ing a nonrefundable retainer and losing an identical (or greater)
amount in the name of quantum meruit. In either case, the client's
ability to obtain a new lawyer is damaged.
It is no answer to say that the quantum meruit payment repre-
sents the "fair and reasonable value of the completed services,"'  at
least insofar as the sum is calculated on the basis of the lawyer's
hours.65 Counsel's services, as of the date of discharge, may have re-
sulted in slight or no benefit to the client, no matter how valuable they
were to the lawyer in terms of expended time. Compelling a client to
pay a lawyer for unproductive services unquestionably "burdens" the
right of discharge.
This situation may arise most clearly in the case of contingent fee
agreements. Personal injury cases usually are taken on contingency,
typically ranging from twenty-five percent to forty percent of the ulti-
mate recovery. In many jurisdictions, a discharged contingent-fee
lawyer is entitled to quantum meruit compensation, not to exceed the
maximum fee provided in the fee agreement.66 This approach fairly
62. In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1072-73 (N.Y. 1994).
63. See Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d at 1072; Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Revis-
ited, supra note 3, at 51.
64. Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d at 1072; see also Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Re-
visited, supra note 3, at 42.
65. See Kannewurf v. Johns, 632 N.E.2d 711, 717 (Ill. App. 1994) (noting that a law-
yer's quantum meruit fee award was calculated on an hourly basis).
66. Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016, 1021 (Fla. 1982); see also Brickman, Setting
the Fee, supra note 3, at 380-82 (recommending that if an attorney is entitled to recover
quantum meruit, "the courts must limit the attorney's recovery to the contract price").
Brickman and Cunningham endorse the approach of using the contingent fee contract per-
centage as a cap on any quantum meruit payment. Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers
Revisited, supra note 3, at 43. They recognize that such a cap is necessary to protect the
client from having to pay the discharged lawyer even in the event of non-recovery for the
client. Id They do not appear to recognize, however, that any quantum meruit payment
to a discharged contingent-fee lawyer, cap or no cap, will operate as a penalty to the client.
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compensates the lawyer, but leaves the client facing a dilemma. In
most cases, she will have to retain a new contingent-fee attorney,
obliging her to pay both a contingency and the quantum meruit
amount. Alternatively, she might attempt to find a new lawyer who
will credit the quantum meruit payments against the eventual contin-
gency, but this could dramatically limit the range of counsel from
which she may choose.67 In either circumstance, the quantum meruit
principle severely taxes the client's exercise of the right to discharge
counsel.
Of course, no court is likely to hold that a discharged lawyer au-
tomatically forfeits all fees. 68 Even the Cooperman court recognized
the need to "deter clients from taking undue advantage of attor-
neys. ' 69 Some nonrefundable retainers-between some lawyers and
some clients-are surely used as a hedge against economically exploi-
tive discharge. Unfortunately, neither the New York Court of Ap-
peals nor Brickman and Cunningham admit this possibility, and
consequently neither attend to the economic similarities between
nonrefundable retainers and payments in quantum meruit.
There is certainly a moral difference between providing payments
in quantum meruit and allowing a nonperforming lawyer to keep a
nonrefundable retainer. But both the New York Court of Appeals
and Brickman and Cunningham grounded their arguments on the cli-
ent's right to fire her attorney, not on the immorality of allowing the
lawyer to keep the money. The client-based appeal, though, should be
recognized as an economic argument; to be convincing it must con-
67. For example, in Kannewurf, the Kannewurfs originally retained counsel to bring a
personal injury action, agreeing to pay a contingency fee of one third of any eventual re-
covery. Kannewurf, 632 N.E.2d at 712. Once the litigation was well under way, the clients
and their lawyer had a falling-out, which led to counsel's withdrawal. Id. Thereafter, the
Kannewurfs obtained a judgment for $120, 000, which would have led to a maximum con-
tingency fee of $40, 000. Id. at 713. The original lawyer then petitioned for a quantum
meruit fee. Id. He was eventually awarded $31, 360, reflecting 224 hours at a rate of $140.
Id. at 714. The opinion does not disclose what the Kannewurfs paid to their new attorney,
but any payment of more than $9000 would result in a financial penalty to the clients as a
consequence of discharging their first lawyer.
68. Indeed, some courts have approved quantum meruit payments even to lawyers
who were discharged for cause. In Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley, P.A. v.
Scheller, 629 So. 2d 947 (Fla. App. 1993), the Florida Court of Appeals allowed quantum
meruit fees to a lawyer who not only breached his fee agreement with the client, but who
also abandoned the client "at a critical stage, without adequate protection for the client's
interests." Id. at 949. There can be little doubt that the prospect of a quantum meruit
payment-will discourage, if not deter, some clients from firing their lawyers for misfea-
sance, a right that is even more essential than the right to discharge counsel without cause.
See In re Pagano, 607 N.E.2d 1242, 1250 (Ill. 1992) (stating that a lawyer may be awarded
reasonable attorney's fees notwithstanding a breach of fiduciary duty to his client).
69. In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (N.Y. 1994).
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sider the reality that, from the client's perspective; money is fungible.
One could, of course, make the moral argument that allowing
nonrefundable retainers is simply dishonorable. But that position,
stripped of a basis in the client's economic interest, would have to take
greater account of individual autonomy and the freedom of contract.
70
IV. GENERAL RETAINERS
Brickman and Cunningham and the New York Court of Appeals
accept the use of so-called general retainers, apparently even if they
are nonrefundable.71 While the Cooperman court's comments on this
subject were opaque,72 Brickman and Cunningham attempt to draw a
principled distinction between general nonrefundable retainers (ethi-
cally permissible) and specific nonrefundable retainers (ethically im-
permissible). The distinction, however, is untenable and further
weakens their basic argument. According to Brickman and Cunning-
ham, a general retainer
is a commitment to be available to represent the client in
matters where the services may or may not need to be ren-
dered in matters that may yet be unknown and undefined.
The client paying a general retainer is therefore getting
something for the payment: a contractual commitment that
the lawyer will be on call to handle the client's legal matters,
if and when the client needs her.73
Such a retainer, they posit, is never unearned; it need not be refund-
able74 because it is "earned when paid. '75 This analysis fails.
Accepting Brickman and Cunningham's definition of a general
retainer as an "option" payment for a specified period of future avail-
ability,76 it is evident that such a retainer is only "earned" once the
obligation of availability is fulfilled. An attorney who accepts a gen-
eral retainer, but who does not make herself available to the client,
should at the very least be liable for a refund. Following Brickman
and Cunningham's general reasoning, a lawyer similarly should not be
able to keep a general retainer following mid-stream firing by the cli-
70. See supra part II.
71. See Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d at 1074; Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Revis-
ited, supra note 3, at 23-25.
72. The Cooperman Court held that "[m]inimum fee arrangements and general retain-
ers that provide for fees, not laden with the nonrefundability impediment irrespective of
any services, will continue to be valid and not subject in and of themselves to professional
discipline." Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d at 1074.
73. Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Revisited, supra note 3, at 23.
74. Id. at 8 n.26.
75. Id. at 17.
76. Id. at 23.
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ent, as that would burden the client's "inviolate right to discharge her
lawyer at any time, for any reason, without penalty.
'77
Until the period of availability is fully rendered, general retainers
should be indistinguishable from specific retainers, at least regarding
the client's interest in her right to discharge counsel. Brickman and
Cunningham want clients always to be able to say, "I no longer want
you to perform a specific task so give me back my money." If that is
so, clients should also be able to say, "I no longer want you to be
available so give me back my money.
78
Brickman and Cunningham have not presented a convincing ar-
gument for the differential treatment of general and specific retainers.
Absent further justification, the same ethical rule of refundability
ought to apply to both forms of retention. Accordingly, if nonrefund-
able general retainers are ethically permissible (as Brickman and Cun-
ningham acknowledge),79 then nonrefundable specific retainers must
be acceptable as well.
V. ETrics EXPERTS
Brickman and Cunningham also would apply the nonrefundable
retainer rule to the situation of "attorneys who testify as expert wit-
nesses on the law of lawyering or who assist in matters by serving 'of
counsel.' "80 Here their analysis breaks down completely.
Brickman and Cunningham note that it is "widely assumed that a
half dozen or so such experts, mostly law school professors, are the
most sought after of their type and command . . . substantial
nonrefundable retainers,"8 " and that these experts contend that ban-
ning nonrefundable retainers would prevent them from realizing the
full economic benefit of their hard-earned reputations. s2 Brickman
and Cunningham then reject this position, on the ground that it would
77. Id. at 13.
78. Of course, any refund would have to be prorated over the life of the retainer.
Perhaps the general retainer lawyer would also be entitled to some additional payment as
compensation for foregone opportunities, although Brickman and Cunningham deny this
possibility to lawyers who have been specifically retained. See supra note 24 and accompa-
nying text.
79. Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Revisited, supra note 3, at 9.
80. Id. at 36.
81. Id. at 37. The American Lawyer reports that Professor Geoffrey Hazard requires a
retainer of $5000, and a $500 hourly fee, for work as an ethics expert. Susan Beck, Midas
Touch in the Ivory Tower, AM. LAW., Apr. 1994, at 60. Professors Stephen Gillers, Charles
Wolfram, and Monroe Freedman are also identified as frequently engaged expert wit-
nesses; their hourly fees are almost as high as Hazard's, but no mention is made of an up-
front retainer. Id.
82. Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Revisited, supra note 3, at 37.
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require an inquiry in every case into the identity and reputation of the
expert.8 3
The missing point, however, is that expert witnesses are not-in-
deed, cannot be-fiduciaries of clients.84 Ethics experts, though law-
yers in the professional sense, do not function as lawyers when
retained to consult in lawsuits. Since virtually the entire argument
against nonrefundable retainers is based on counsel's fiduciary obliga-
tions,8 5 it would seem facially inapplicable to expert witnesses.
The duty of an expert witness is to be objective, not to safeguard
client interests or advance client goals. Indeed, experts must be pains-
takingly honest, even if that means arriving at an opinion that is con-
trary or damaging to the client's position in litigation.8 6 In evaluating
a case, an ethics expert must be ready and willing to say "No" to the
client, even when the client has a plausible claim or defense.8 7
Because of the absolute requirement that experts not stand as
fiduciaries to their clients, there can be no "inviolate right" to dis-
charge an expert "without penalty." While litigants are obviously free
to terminate the retention of expert witnesses, no policy is served by
attempting to make such discharge costless.
Moreover, important policy goals may be advanced through an
expert's use of nonrefundable retainers.88 A lawyer is permitted to
share the economic risk of litigation with a client; an ethical expert
83. Id. at 37.
84. I assume that ethics experts who appear "of counsel" may be treated, for the pur-
pose of determining fees, in the same manner as any other lawyers. Brickman and Cm-
ningham do not develop this point, and I am not aware of any specific law on the subject.
My concern in this section is the treatment of consulting or testifying experts, who assist
lawyers in a nonfiduciary capacity. Such an expert is one who "has been retained or spe-
cially employed ... in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial," and who may or
may not be called to testify. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4).
85. Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Revisited, supra note 3, at 6-8.
86. In most jurisdictions an expert may be retained initially on a consulting, non-testi-
fying basis. Thus, an opinion that is unwelcome by the client will usually be shielded from
discovery. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26. Even under this protection, however, the expert
must be willing to give the client the bad news.
87. The duty of an expert, then, is in sharp contrast to the duty of a lawyer, which is to
raise every non-frivolous claim or defense unless instructed otherwise by the client. See
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CorNucr Rule 1.2 (1992) (describing a client's authority
over the scope and objectives of representation); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
sPONsIBiLrry DR 7-101 (1981) (describing the attorney's duty to seek her client's lawful
objectives).
88. From time to time I serve as an expert witness in cases involving issues of profes-
sional responsibility, although I would not presume to place myself among the half dozen
elite experts referenced by Brickman and Cunningham. In any event, I do not use
nonrefundable retainers.
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cannot.89 Receiving a lump-sum fee in advance may actually reinforce
the independence of an expert, who will be ensured payment and
freed from any dependence on the good will of the client.90 In this
light, a nonrefundable retainer can be viewed as the equivalent of a
guaranteed minimum, paid in consideration of the expert's objectiv-
ity.91 Such a payment might also remove the appearance of any incen-
tive to generate additional work on the case by reaching a favorable
opinion. The enhancement of an expert's visible independence could
prove to be of value to the client in the event that the matter proceeds
to trial.
Finally, it should be noted that essentially no opportunity for
overreaching exists in the retention of an expert witness. First, a client
does not rely on an expert for "advice on virtually all subjects they
discuss, including the consequences ... of a particular fee arrange-
ment."' Perhaps even more important, experts are seldom, if ever,
retained directly by the client. Rather, the usual, if not universal,
practice is for counsel to investigate, interview, and negotiate eventual
terms with potential expert witnesses. Thus, the client virtually always
has the benefit of independent legal advice in evaluating the terms of
the engagement of a consulting or testifying expert.
VII. CONCLUSION
Brickman and Cunningham's paradigm case is too easy. The
problem they identify is the overreaching lawyer who extracts a
nonrefundable retainer from a naive client, and then does little or no
work.93 With almost unimaginable chutzpah, the lawyer proceeds to
invoke the retainer agreement as a defense against returning the cli-
89. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3.4(b), cmt., para. 3 (1992);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-109(C) (1981); see also STEVEN
LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY 211 (1993) (discussing ethics of various fee arrange-
ments with expert witnesses).
90. See LuBET, supra note 89, at 205 (noting that "it may be evidence of something
less than objectivity if the witness has a large unpaid fee outstanding at the time that she
testifies"). Indeed, the same theory underlies the life tenure afforded to federal judges.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
91. Of course, it would be fraudulent for an expert to obtain a nonrefundable retainer
and then refuse to do the work.
92. Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Revisited, supra note 3, at 11.
93. Id. at 37 (quoting In re Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d 855, 858 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993))
("'We find that it is unconscionable that the respondent could claim that he earned $15,
000 by filing a notice of appearance on a client's behalf.' "); id at 8 (quoting Cooperman,
591 N.Y.S.2d at 856) ("A nonrefundable retainer is one that 'allow[s] an attorney to keep
an advance payment irrespective of whether the services contemplated are rendered.' ");
id. at 9 ("[S]uch a retainer is forbidden because otherwise the lawyer would be able to
charge the client for work he did not do."). Nonrefundable retainers "enable lawyers to
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ent's money. In other words, the fee arrangement is not simply abu-
sive; it borders on theft.
Some lawyers operate that way, as appears to have been the case
in Cooperman, but broad rules of conduct are not usually the pre-
ferred approach to deterring a fraud-inclined minority. For example,
there are no doubt far more lawyers who pad their bills or charge
unconscionable hourly rates,94 but the basic negotiation of fee con-
tracts is still left to individual lawyers and clients, free from the heavy
hand of the disciplinary authorities. 5
Lawyers who use nonrefundable retainers to commit fraud
should be identified and disciplined. But what about other, less felo-
nious uses of the device? Is it possible that nonrefundable retainers
might be justified as a way to protect lawyers against unfair discharge?
Or to compensate attorneys who are able to resolve matters
quickly? 96 Or to allocate certain risks between lawyer and client?
Brickman and Cunningham do not comment on these apparently rea-
charge fees for work not done." Id. at 10. In addition, "[a] lawyer cannot charge a fee for
doing nothing." Id. at 17.
Brickman and Cunningham include as an appendix various client letters complaining
about attorney Cooperman. In one letter the client requested the return of her retainer
because Cooperman's actions and inactions had caused her to lose trust and confidence in
him. In requesting a refund, the client wrote to Cooperman: "We gave you $10, 000 in
cash which was all the money we had. You said that you could keep [my husband] out of
prison & that there wasn't a thing to worry about .... I'm left here with no money and no
husband to make up the money that was given to you." Id. at 49. Cooperman insisted that
the entire retainer was nonrefundable. Even after being admonished for failure to return
these funds, Cooperman continued to enter into nonrefundable fee agreements and to in-
sist on their validity in spite of client complaints. Id. at 14.
94. See Lerman, supra note 36, at 661-66; see also Randall Samborn, Overbillings De-
tailed, NAT'L LU., May 9, 1994, at A4 (reporting admission of overbilling by partner at a
prominent law firm). Regarding the possibility of drafting an ethics rule to govern over-
staffing, see supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
95. Professor Lerman suggests a disciplinary rule to govern the increments in which
lawyers may bill their clients, going so far as to include provisions for permissible, and
impermissible, rounding. Lerman, supra note 36, at 750-52. This proposal has not been
endorsed by any court or commentator. Regarding honest and dishonest billing practice,
see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 379 (1993) (dis-
cussing billing for professional fees, disbursements, and other expenses).
96. One advantage of the contingent fee, as opposed to hourly billing, is that it re-
wards the lawyer for bringing a case to a quick resolution. A nonrefundable retainer, or
guaranteed minimum fee, could perform the same function in a case where a contingency is
impractical or improper. For example, an adoption case has no res from which a contin-
gency can be derived, and contingent fees are not allowed in divorce cases as a matter of
public policy. See supra note 43. Unscrupulous lawyers, receiving payment by the hour,
have been known to drag out such cases in order to enhance their billings. In either situa-
tion, however, a nonrefundable retainer could operate as a bonus for timeliness, thereby
providing the attorney with a reasonable incentive to handle the matter as promptly as
possible. Not all clients would care for such an arrangement, but an ethical prohibition on
nonrefundable retainers deprives them of the choice.
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sonable uses of the nonrefundable retainer, other than to argue that
they do not justify nonrefundability.97 The question, however, is not
whether nonrefundable retainers are prudent or wise-those issues
should be left to the lawyers and clients to decide between themselves.
Rather, the critical inquiry is whether the non-fraudulent98 use of
nonrefundable retainers is nonetheless so corrosive as to require a per
se prohibition.
For example, hourly rates of $600 are probably, by and large, un-
justified. The use of two or three associates, supervised by one or
more partners, to prepare a deposition is, in most cases, unjustified.
There are numerous contemporary fee practices that are essentially
unjustifiable, but which are not outlawed, and for good reason.99 It
takes more than a few instances of breathtaking abuse to warrant the
professional equivalent of criminalization of a fee arrangement.
Brickman and Cunningham have thoroughly dispelled any doubt
that may have existed over whether nonrefundable retainers can be
oppressive and abusive. The greater burden of their project, however,
is to demonstrate that such arrangements are ethically unacceptable
under all circumstances. Here they may be right as well, but neither
they, nor the courts that have adopted their position, have yet rigor-
ously established the full extent of that proposition.
97. See Brickman & Cunningham, Retainers Revisited, supra note 3, at 22-29.
98. It would be non-fraudulent for a lawyer to negotiate a nonrefundable retainer
(making full disclosure), perform fully and satisfactorily, and keep the money under the
terms of the agreement. On the other hand, fraud-by-retainer could occur when a lawyer
extracts a nonrefundability agreement, fails to provide the contracted services, and refuses
to return the advance; another sort of fraud would result when a lawyer is discharged for
cause but still attempts to retain an advance fee. Brickman and Cunningham do not distin-
guish between these situations.
99. Regarding fee practices that are unethical, see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Formal Op. 379 (1993).
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